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INTRODUCTION

The origins of compensating workers for their work-related injuries
dates back to ancient times.1 The Code of Hammurabi, ancient Greek, Roman,
Arab, and Chinese law provided for payments for lost body parts. 2 "For
example ...loss of ajoint of the thumb was worth one-half the value of a finger.
The loss of a penis was compensated by the amount of length lost, and the value
of an ear was based on its surface area. ' '3 Workers' compensation in America
developed out of the Industrial Revolution with the first workers' compensation
program established in Wisconsin in 1911.4 The final state, Mississippi, adopted
a program in 1948. 5
Workers' compensation is an insurance system set up to hold employers
strictly liable for the workplace injuries of their employees.6 In return for
employers being held strictly liable, employees are barred from bringing
common law tort claims against their employers.7 Thus, it is a no-fault system of
compensation. Deliberate intent statutes, however, carve out an exception to the
bar of employees bringing a common law cause of action.8 Employees are
allowed to sue an employer and have to prove that the employer acted with a
9
"deliberate intention" to cause the injury to the employee.
This Note explores the implications of deliberate intent within West
Virginia workers' compensation legislation and inevitably argues that the state
Legislature should repeal deliberate intent as a means to draw businesses into the
state. Deliberate intent hurts businesses because they are at risk for more liability
than they would be in other states. To attract business to the state, West Virginia
should repeal its statutory deliberate intent exception and make workers'
compensation the exclusive remedy for workplace injury, thus bringing the state
into line with the similar approaches of several of the surrounding states. To
illustrate that West Virginia has long had it wrong on deliberate intent, that an
exclusive workers' compensation remedy is not a novel or bad idea, and to
explore other concepts of workers' compensation, the laws of Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Maryland, Virginia, and Kentucky (collectively, the "Surrounding States")

I

Gregory P. Guyton, A Brief History of Workers' Compensation, 19 IOWA ORTHOPAEDIC J.
106,
106 (1999),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC I 888620/pdf/IowaOrthopJ- 19106.pdf.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id. at 108.

5

Id.

6

Workers' Compensation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).

7

Id.

8

See 9 LEx K.

LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'

COMPENSATION LAW §

103.01 (Matthew

Bender, rev. ed. 2015).
9

See id.
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are examined. By examining the Surrounding States' workers' compensation
frameworks, it becomes evident that West Virginia has long been at a
disadvantage with its neighbors, who are the most likely competitors for
attracting business. The stimulus for this Note is based on the action and
controversy surrounding the First Session of the 82nd Legislature of West
Virginia wherein it passed reform for deliberate intention as stated in West
Virginia Code section 23-4-2.1o Although the Legislature passed a reform bill,
this Note suggests that the reform is not enough to bring West Virginia in line
with its geographic competition because employers still have too much common
law liability to employees.
Accordingly, the major issue addressed in this Note is how West
Virginia can improve its business environment through workplace safety law
reform. Secondly, did the Legislature get it wrong or right in the new deliberate
intent statute? To solve this problem, there is no need to reinvent the wheel.
First, Part II will provide a brief history of workers' compensation and
deliberate intention exceptions will be discussed to provide an overview of what
workers' compensation is, how it works, and how deliberate intent statutes fit
into the scheme. Then, this Note will provide a brief history and the current status
of each states' deliberate intention law. From this discussion, various workers'
compensation schemes will be observed to illustrate that West Virginia needs to
align itself with the Surrounding States to be competitive in the business market.
Finally, Part III will focus on how West Virginia courts will handle the new law
and argue that the Legislature should repeal the deliberate intent exception to
workers' compensation. This Note will also take into consideration sympathies
from both the plaintiff and defense bar, employees and employers, the legislative
and judicial branches, and good government in general.
II. BACKGROUND

This part begins with a historical background of workers' compensation
and deliberate intent, generally, to provide insight on this area of the law. Section
B will then discuss West Virginia's deliberate intent jurisprudence and the
evolution of its law with particular focus on the infamous Mandolidis v. Elkins
Indus, Inc.," decision. Section C then discusses the Surrounding States to
demonstrate other states' frameworks for workers' compensation, different laws,
and new ideas. This discussion will also illustrate West Virginia's disadvantage
in regards to labor law and ways that West Virginia can improve its law.

To illustrate the controversy, in a conversation with a plaintiff's attorney, I was told that the
statute "creates a higher standard than first-degree murder." Likewise, in conversation with a
defense lawyer the sympathies were that the statute "doesn't do enough."
10

I
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), superseded by statute,
Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 192, 1983 W. Va. Acts 1040, as recognized in Handley v. Union
Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1986).
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A. HistoricalBackground

This section will first provide a brief overview of workers' compensation
and deliberate intent to provide a rudimentary basis of typical workers'
compensation acts, majority and minority rules, and how deliberate intent fits
within the workers' compensation scheme.
1. A Brief Overview of Workers' Compensation
Workers' compensation is a system that compensates workers for
injuries or death sustained from their course of employment.' 2 In return for this
no-fault based system, 13 workers generally forfeit their right to sue their
employers for these injuries. 4
Prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, an
employee's sole remedy against his employer for injuries sustained during the
course of his employment was to bring a common law suit against his employer.15
Because these suits were subject to the employer's defense of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule, the majority of
industrial accidents remained uncompensated. 6
The typical workers' compensation act has eight features: (1) an injured
employee is automatically entitled to benefits; (2) fault is largely immaterial; (3)
independent contractors are not covered; (4) benefits available and amounts
recoverable are set forth; (5) the employee and dependents give up their common
law rights to sue; (6) the right to sue third persons remains; (7) administrative
boards are set up; and (8) employers are required to have insurance. 17
2. A Brief Overview of Deliberate Intention
Fifteen states,18 including West Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky, have
a statutory exception to the exclusivity provision of workers' compensation law
to provide employees with a common law cause of action against an employer

12

See ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
TEXT §

1.01 (5th ed. 2013).
13

Id.

14

Id. § 1.02.
See id. §§ 2.01, 2.03.

15
16

WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (W.
Page

Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
17
I

LARSON, supra note 8, § 1.02.

Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia. Id. § 103.01
n.5.
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causing intentional injury.19 For clarification, because some states use deliberate
20
intentional injury and intentional tort interchangeably, intentional tort will refer
to the common law tort of battery. Whereas, deliberate intentional injury will
refer to, for example, an instance where an employer knows a working condition
21
is unsafe but nonetheless orders employees into the area. Ten states, including
Pennsylvania and Virginia, do not recognize this exception, while other states
have judicially recognized exceptions.22
One legal theory behind having this exception is that an employer cannot
23
allege an injury was an "accident" when in fact it was intentionally committed.
A second theory is that by committing an intentional tort, the employer "severed
the employment relationship. 24 Lastly is the theory that the injury did not "arise
out of the employment., 25 Aside from these legal theories, moral obligations
26
have also been used to justify the exception.
The majority rule is that the deliberate intent exception cannot be used
to include "accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, willful, deliberate,
intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or
other misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate intent
27
directed to the purpose of inflicting injury., However, in 1978 West Virginia
28
became the first jurisdiction to depart from the "actual intent" standard.

19

Id.

20

See infra Part II.C.2.

Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Virginia, and Wyoming. LARSON, supra note 8, § 103.01 n.4.
Id. § 103.01.
22
Id.
23
21

24
25
26
27
28

Id.

Id. (referring to this theory as the "the most fictitious theory of all").
Id.
Id. § 103.03.
Id. § 103.04; see also infra Part II.B.
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B. West Virginia Workers' Compensation
and DeliberateIntent: Almost
29
Heaven for Injured Workers
The Legislature of West Virginia first introduced a deliberate intention
statute in 1913,30 and it was signed into law by Governor Henry Hatfield. 31 The

statute provided that
[i]f injury or death result to an employe[e] from the deliberate
intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the
employe[e], the widow, widower, child or dependent of the
employe[e] shall have the privilege to take under this act, and
also have cause of action against the employer as if this act had
not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount
received or receivable under this act.32
The statute has been amended numerous times in the last 100 years.33
Deliberate intention did not have a statutory definition or standard until
West Virginia Code section 23-4-2 was amended in 1983. 34 Prior to 1983,
deliberate intention was interpreted by the courts with a definition from the 1934

29
JOHN DENVER, TAKE ME HOME, COUNTRY ROADS (RCA Records 1971). Title refers to the
courts' willingness to compensate injured workers above and beyond workers' compensation
insurance.
30
Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 10, sec. 28, 1913 W. Va. Acts 77.
31
Henry Drury Hatfield, W.
VA.
DIVISION
OF
CULTURE
& HIST.,
http://www.wvculture.org/history/govemment/govemors/henhat.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
Governor Hatfield was a friend of workers, particularly coal miners, helping to settle labor strikes
and offering his services as a medical doctor to families living in temporary camps during labor
strikes.
Carolyn
M.
Karr,
Henry D. Hatfield, W.
VA.
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.wvencyclopedia.org/articles/280 (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
32
Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 10, sec. 28, 1913 W. Va. Acts 77.
33
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2 (LexisNexis 2016); Workers' Compensation Act,
ch. 248,
2005 W. Va. Acts 2083; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 27, 2003 W. Va. Acts 2nd Ex. Sess. 385;
Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 61, 1994 W. Va. Acts 1283; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 16,
1991 W. Va. Acts 326; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 192, 1983 W. Va. Acts 1040; Workers'
Compensation Act, ch. 152, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1272; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 136, 1949
W. Va. Acts 610; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 131, 1945 W. Va. Acts 494; Workers'
Compensation Act, ch. 104, 1937 W. Va. Acts 422; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 131, sec. 28,
1919 W. Va. Acts 480; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 9, sec. 28, 1915 W. Va. Acts 72.
34
Compare Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 192, 1983 W. Va. Acts 1040 (stating that
the
Legislature was not satisfied with the common law tort system handling of the deliberate intention
claims and provided further guidance for the courts by adopting a standard of proof), with Workers'
Compensation Act, ch. 152, 1969 W. Va. Acts 1272; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 136, 1949
W. Va. Acts 610; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 131, 1945 W. Va. Acts 494; Workers'
Compensation Act, ch. 104, 1937W. Va. Acts 422; Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 131, sec. 28,
1919 W. Va. Acts 480; and Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 9, sec. 28, 1915 W. Va. Acts 72.
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case Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co. 35 The court held that in a deliberate
intention action, "[a]llegations ... of gross negligence by the employer do not
constitute deliberate intention .... [A]t the very least, there must be alleged facts
from which the natural and probable consequence reasonably to be anticipated
36
would be death or serious injury to the employee affected thereby.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia modified this definition
37
in 1936 in Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., holding that "a specific intent
on the part of the employer to produce the injury must be shown to support a
recovery in such case."38 Here, the court relied on rulings made in the states of
Washington and Oregon.39 It did so because Washington first adopted its
deliberate intention statute in 1911.40 West Virginia and Oregon adopted their
statutes, virtually identical to the Washington law, in 1913.41 This standard was
42
supplanted in 1951 in Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc. There, the
court held that in a deliberate intention action, the employee must "allege facts
showing, or clearly implying, such intent; negligence, however wanton, does not
supply such intent., 43 The last decision consistent with the court's higher
standard to prove deliberate intention was in 1976 with Eisnauglev. Booth.44 The
court held that "[n]either gross negligence nor wanton misconduct are such as to
45 The
constitute deliberate intention as contemplated by [the statute].,
overarching theme to this string of early cases is that to prove deliberate
intention, the employee must make a showing of a sort of mens rea on the part
of the employer.46
In 1978, the definition of deliberate intention changed drastically with
47
of Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc. The plaintiff, James
holding
the

35

175 S.E. 70 (W. Va. 1934).

36

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

186 S.E. 612 (W. Va. 1936), overruledby Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907
37
(W. Va. 1978).
38
39

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
Id. at 613-14.

40
41

Id. at 613.
See id.

42

65 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1951), overruledby Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d 907.

43

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

44

226 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1976), overruled by Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d 907.

45

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

See Eisnaugle, 226 S.E.2d 259; Brewer, 65 S.E.2d 87; Allen, 186 S.E. 612; Maynard v.
Island Creek Coal Co., 175 S.E. 70 (W. Va. 1934).
47
246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), superseded by statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2 (Lexis
2016).
Nexis
46
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Manolidis,48 was injured by operating a table saw without a safety guard, a safety
violation known about by his employer.4 9 The court held, with Justice Darrell
McGraw 50 writing, that "[u]nder [section] 23-4-2 an employer is subject to a
common law tort action for damages or for wrongful death where such employer
commits an intentional tort or engages in wilful, wanton, and reckless
misconduct,"'" thereby expressly overruling Allen, Brewer, and Eisnaugle.52 The
court reasoned that the "workmen's compensation system completely supplanted
the common law tort system only with respect to [n]egligently caused industrial
accidents., 53 McGraw criticized the holding in Brewer because the reasoning
was adopted from the Washington and Oregon courts, who interpret deliberate
intent by looking at the states' murder statutes.5 4 He further reasoned that because
West Virginia recognizes distinctions in negligent conduct, "when death or
injury results from wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct such death or injury is
no longer accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and must be taken as
having been inflicted with deliberate intention for the purposes of the workmen's
55
compensation act.",
In 1983, the Legislature amended section 26-4-2 to supplant the standard
adopted in Mandolidis by stating that it intended a "more narrow application"
than "willful, wanton and reckless misconduct. 56 The Legislature then amended
the law stating specific requirements of when an employer acts with deliberate

48
Tom D. Miller, Mandolidis Case, W. VA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 8, 2010),
http://www.wvencyclopedia.org/articles/1485. The title of the case is actually a misspelling of the
plaintiffs name.
49
Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 915.
50
Justice McGraw later went on to become the West Virginia Attorney General, where he was
named as one of the worst attorneys general in the country. Attorney General DarrellMcGraw
Named Fifth Worst State AG by Competitive EnterpriseInstitute, W. VA. WATCHDOG (JULY 12,
2010),
http://westvirginia.watchdog.org/5067/attorney-general-darrell-mcgraw-named-fifthworst-state-ag-by-competitive-enterprise-institute/. Additionally, Darrell McGraw filed to run for
election to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, again. Hoppy Kercheval, Darrell
McGraw Throws Curveballat Supreme Court FilingDeadline, METRONEWS (Feb. 2, 2016, 12:39
AM),
http://wvmetronews.com/2016/02/02/darrell-mcgraw-throws-a-curve-ball-at-filingdeadline/. He lost. See Election Results Center: Statewide Results PrimaryElection -May 10, 2016

Official

Results,

W.

VA.

SEC.

OF

STATE,

http://services.sos.wv.gov/apps/elections/results/results.aspx?year-2016&eid=22&county-State
wide (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
51
Syl. Pt. 1,Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 909 (emphasis added).
52

Id.

53

Id. at 913.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 914.

56

1983 W. Va. Acts 1040-43.
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intention, which have remained intact with additions made culminating in the
2015 amendment.57
As previously discussed, in 2015, the Legislature again heightened the
standard of deliberate intention. 58 A comparison of the 2005 version of the
deliberate intention statute with the 2015 amended version reveals striking
similarities. 59 The 2015 version of West Virginia Code section 23-4-2(d)(l)(2)(B)(i) are verbatim to those of the 2005 version. 60 The major differences
contained in in the 2015 version of the law can be broken down into three
sections-(1) the actual knowledge provision, (2) the specific unsafe working
condition provision, and (3) the injury provision.6 1 Subpart (C) of the 2015
version is an addition relating to the requirement of an expert opinion and other
evidentiary and procedural burdens that are not the focus of this Note. Each
provision will be discussed in Part III to compare and contrast the 2015 version
with the 2005 version6 2 of the deliberate intent statute. Pack your bags for a
jurisprudential road trip of the Surrounding States.
C. Evolution of Laws in Surrounding States
Section C will begin the discussion of the Surrounding States. The
purpose for discussing the Surrounding States is because they are West
Virginia's geographic competitors for business. Because they are competitors,
their systems of workers' compensation must be demonstrated. Examining the
workers' compensation systems and deliberate intent frameworks of the
Surrounding States reveals that West Virginia is at a disadvantage and that
systems exist where workers' compensation is an exclusive remedy for
workplace injury, whether it is per se or de facto.

57
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2 (LexisNexis 2016); 2005 W. Va. Acts 2084-86; 2003 W.
Va. Acts 385-89; 1994 W. Va. Acts 1283-86; 1991 W. Va. Acts 326-30; 1983 W. Va. Acts 104043.
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2.
58
59
60
61

62

Compare 2005 W. Va. Acts 2084-86, with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2.
Compare 2005 W. Va. Acts 2084-86, with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2.
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(II)-(III).
2005 was the last time the law was amended prior to 2015. See supra note 33.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2017

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 9
1008

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. l19

1. Pennsylvania: The Quaker State Doesn't Believe in Conflict 63
Pennsylvania does not have a specific statutory exclusion for deliberate
intention under its workers' compensation statute.64 The exclusivity provision in
the code states that "[t]he liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive
and in place of any and all other liability to such employe[e]s.,, 65 However, a
narrow exception was judicially recognized in interpreting the statute as it existed
prior to 1972.66
In Readinger v. Gottschall,67 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
that an intentional tort by the employer against the employee was compensable
outside of the workers' compensation statute. 68 The plaintiff was injured when
her and her two employers got into an argument over the amount of her final
paycheck.69 The argument turned physical and the plaintiff was pushed out of the
door, stumbled outside, and cracked something in her back.70 The plaintiff filed
an action for trespass on the case for this assault. 71 The court further held that
workers' compensation only covered accidents and that there was "no intention
that deliberate injury to an employe[e] by his employer [wa]s intended to be
covered., 72 This case was not taken up by Pennsylvania's highest court, thus the
"intentional tort" exception to Pennsylvania workers' compensation remained
somewhat unclear. 73
In 1972, nine years after Readinger, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
amended the state's workers' compensation statute by removing "accident" and
replacing it with "in the course of employment. 74 This change likely removed
the validity of the intentional tort exception, as stated in Readinger.75 The current
Pennsylvania statute reads as follows:

63
Pennsylvania is referred to as the "Quaker State." Pennsylvania, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pennsylvania#Nicknames (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). Quakers
notoriously do not believe in fighting and this is evidenced by a consistency of deliberate intent
law and the relative small amount of decisions on the issue. Religions: Quakers, BBC (July 3,
2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/christianity/subdivisions/quakers-I.shtml.
64
See 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 481 (2016).
65

Id.

66

69

Megay v. Union Carbide Corp., 46 Pa. D. & C.3d 461, 465-66 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas 1987).
191 A.2d 694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963), supersededby statute, 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 481 (2016).
Id. at 696.
Id. at 695.

70

Id.

71

Id.
Id. at 696.

67
68

72

74

See Barber v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 555 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. 1989).
Id. at 771-72.

75

Id.

73
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The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and
in place of any and all other liability to such employe[e]s, his
legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next
of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at
law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in
and (2)2 or occupational disease as defined in
section 301(c)(1)
section 108. 6
77
2. Ohio: The Buckeyes Aren't the Only Nuts

Ohio has a statutory exclusion to workers' compensation claims for
deliberate intent by the employer 78 and has a constitutional provision authorizing
the establishment of a workers' compensation program. 79 This provision states
in relevant part that "[s]uch compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to
compensation, or damages... and any employer who pays the premium or
compensation provided by law, passed in accordance herewith, shall not be liable
to respond in damages at common law or by statute." 80 Ohio courts and the
Legislature have gone back and forth with rulings 81and amendments concerning
the workers' compensation law since its inception.
In 1934, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that open liability of employers
had been abolished. 82 However, in 1939, the court in Triff v. NationalBronze &
Aluminum Foundry Co. expressly overruled this holding and ruled that "[t]he
right of action of an employee for the negligence of his employer directly
83
resulting in a non-compensable occupational disease has not been taken away.
This decision was handed down on March 22, 1939.84 On May 25, 1939, the
Ohio General Assembly amended the workers' compensation law to eliminate
the liability announced in Triff85

76

77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 481 (2016).

77
The Ohio State University uses the buckeye as its mascot. Traditions, OHIO ST. U.,
http://www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com/trads/buckeye.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). A buckeye is
a nut. Id. The "other nuts" refer to the back and forth between the Ohio legislature and Supreme
Court.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2745.01 (West 2016).
78
79

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35.

80

Id.

See Belvis v. Armco Steel Corp., 93 N.E.2d 33, 36-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
Mabley & Carew Co. v. Lee, 193 N.E. 745, 747 (Ohio 1934), overruled in part by Triff v.
Nat. Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 20 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio 1939), supersededby statute, OHIO
CONST. art. II, § 35.
83
Syl. Pt. 2, Triff, 20 N.E.2d at 232.
Id. at 232.
84
Weil v. Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc., 35 N.E.2d 613, 614 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
85
81
82
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In 1982, the Supreme Court of Ohio announced its decision in
Blankenship v. CincinnatiMilacron Chemicals, Inc.86 The court heard arguments
on whether an intentional tort by an employer was covered under the workers'
compensation statute. 87 The court held, relying in part on the liberal construction
clause in the statute,8 8 that by using the phrase "in the course of employment,"
the Legislature "has expressly limited the scope of compensability" and that the
courts were free to determine what risks are incidental of employment. 89
Therefore, "[a]n employee is not precluded by [the Constitution] or [statute] from
enforcing his common law remedies against his employer for an intentional
tort." 90 The court went on to define an intentional tort as "an act committed with
the intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is
substantially certain to occur." 9'
In 1986, the General Assembly, in response to the above "substantially
certain to occur" language, enacted a statute defining "substantially certain" to
require that the employer act with "deliberate intent to cause an employee to
suffer injury, disease, condition, or death., 92 However, in Brady v. Saftey-Kleen
Corp.,93 the court held that the Legislature exceeded its authority pursuant to
sections 34 and 35 of the Ohio Constitution in enacting this statute, and it was
thus unconstitutional, the common law cause of action remaining intact. 94 The
back and forth between the Supreme Court and General Assembly continued
when the Legislature again passed a law to overrule the court's analysis in Fyffe
v. Jeno 's, Inc., 95 wherein the court outlined the elements of deliberate intent to
be
(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous
process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its
business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if the
employee is subjected by his employment to such dangerous
process, procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to

86

433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982), superseded by statute,OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (West

2015).
87
Id. (The court was only hearing an appeal of the granting of a motion for summary judgment.
Thus, the nature of the intentional tort was not discussed as it is an issue of fact).
88
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §4123.95 (West 2016).
89
Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
90
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
91
Jones v. VIP Dev. Corp., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (Ohio 1984), supersededby statute, OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (West 2015).
92
See Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A. Inc., 983 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (Ohio 2012).
93 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991), supersededby statute, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (West
2015).
94 Syl. Pt. 2, Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 723.
95 570 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 1991).
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the employee will be a substantial certainty; and (3) that the
employer, under such circumstances, and with such knowledge,
did act to require the employee to continue to perform the
dangerous task.96
The 1995 law passed in response to this holding defined an employer intentional
tort as "an act committed by an employer in which the employer deliberately and
intentionally injures, causes an occupational disease of, or causes the death of an
employee. 9 7 This law was again held to be unconstitutional.98 The General
Assembly then passed the current version of Ohio's employer deliberate
intention statute in 2004 which states that a common law action can be brought,
but "the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer
committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that
the injury was substantially certain to occur." 99 Furthermore, deliberate removal
of safety equipment or misrepresentation of toxic substances "creates a
rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed
with intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or condition
occurs as a direct result." 100
The Supreme Court of Ohio and the Ohio General Assembly now appear
to be at peace over how to define an employer's intentional tort. The deliberate
intention statute survived a constitutional challenge in Kaminski v. Metal & Wire
Products Co.1°1 In finding the statute constitutional, the court found other
considerations to rationalize its holding.0 2 One of these considerations is that the
court recognizes that the Ohio deliberate intention statute "appears to harmonize
the law of this state with the law that governs a clear majority of jurisdictions"
and that it "by no means places Ohio outside the national mainstream relative to
employer intentional torts and the exclusivity of the workers' compensation
remedy."1

03

96

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

97

See Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A. Inc., 983 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ohio 2012).
Syl. Pt. 1, Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio 1999).

98

99 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2745.01 (A) (West 2016).
1o Id.§ 2745.01(C).
101 927 N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio 2010).
Id. at 1088.
102
103

Id.
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3. Maryland: Crabcakes, Football, and Good Jurisprudence?1" 4
Maryland has a statutory exclusion from workers' compensation for the
deliberately intentional acts of the employer. 10 5 Like many other states that
enacted workers' compensation statutes in the early twentieth century, Maryland
passed its statute in 1914.106 The first deliberate intention statute in Maryland has
remained largely unchanged and reads as follows:
If injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate
intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the
employee, the widow, widower, children, or dependents of the
employee shall have the privilege either to take under this article
[or] to have [a] cause of action against such employer, as if this
article had not been passed. 107
The Court of Appeals of Maryland was first confronted with the
deliberate intention statute in Mayor of Hagerstown v. Schreiner.18 There the

court held, without defining "deliberate intention," that "[a]s against an employer
who has provided the insurance and who has not 'from deliberate intention
produced such injury or death,' the remedy by compensation under the act is
exclusive."' 9
By and large, the Court of Appeals has not had to address the deliberate
intention issue frequently. Perhaps the leading case in the area, at least as it
pertains to this Note, is Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc." 0 In

Johnson, the court was asked to find that in order for the deliberate intention
statute to apply, two elements must be satisfied: (1) establish that the employer
intentionally did the act that caused the injury and (2) the employer's requisite
intention includes willful, wanton, and reckless conduct."' The facts of the case
are that a 16-year-old boy was working on a farm and was asked to operate a
pump submerged in liquid. 1 2 Prior to this task, the employer was cited by the
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("MOSHA") because
the same pump had defects in electrical components." 3 The employer then

(Tapestry Films 2005).

104

WEDDING CRASHERS

105

See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-509(d) (West 2016).
See Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 709 (Md. 1986).

106

Mayor of Hagerstown v. Schreiner, 109 A. 464, 465 (Md. 1920) (quoting then existing
section 45 article 101 of the Maryland Code).
108
Id.
107

109

Id.

110

503 A.2d 708 (Md. 1986).

III

Id.at 712.
Id. at 709.

112

113 Id.
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falsely informed MOSHA that the defects had been corrected.' 14 The boy was
electrocuted."1 5
This case was the first time the Maryland court was tasked with
elaborating on what "deliberate intention" means.' 1 6 In searching for this answer,
the court noted that in the vast majority of jurisdictions deliberate intention
means "the formation by the employer of a specific intention to cause injury or
death combined with some action aimed at accomplishing such result, as opposed
to mere employer negligence or gross negligence." '' 17 The court also noted the
in
two minority jurisdictions where courts have held otherwise:" 8 West Virginia 120
Inc.
Mandolidis"19 and Ohio in Blankenship v. CincinnatiMilacron Chemicals,
Essentially, the court was asked to adopt the minority view. 12 1 The court declined
to follow the minority view, holding that "an employer has acted with 'deliberate
intention' pursuant to [the statute] only where that employer had determined to
within the same class and used some means to
injure an employee or ' employees
22
goal."'
this
accomplish
Although Maryland does not recognize willful, wanton, or reckless
conduct as falling within the deliberate intention exception to workers'
compensation, it does recognize an intentional tort exception. 23 In Federated
DepartmentStores, Inc. v. Le, 124 the issue was whether the intentional tort claims
of false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation were
included in the deliberate intention exception. 25 The caveat of the case was that
the alleged tortfeasor against the employee was another employee, being the
regional director of security. 126 The court had to interpret prior cases 127 holding
that an employee could recover from the intentional torts of a co-employee only
if that employee was the "alter ego" of the employer. 2 8 The court concluded that

114

Id.

Hs
116

Id.
Id. at 711.

117

Id.

"18

121

Id.
246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978).
433 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ohio 1982).
Johnson, 503 A.2d at 711.

122

Id. at 714.

119
120

124

See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Le, 595 A.2d 1067, 1072 (Md. 1991).
Id.

125

Id. at 1068-69.

126

Id. at 1070.

123

127
See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Schatz v. York
Steak House Sys., Inc., 444 A.2d 1045 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
FederatedDept. Stores, Inc., 595 A.2d at 1069.
128
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if alleged acts are encompassed by the workers' compensation statute, the
deliberate intention exception would apply to the facts of this case.12 9
The current deliberate intention statute in Maryland provides for
essentially the same thing as the original statute, but uses more gender-neutral
language and outlines that a plaintiff may "(1) bring a claim for compensation
' 130
under this title; or (2) bring an action for damages against the employer."
4. Virginia is for Lovers'
Unlike West Virginia, Virginia does not have a deliberate intention
exception to its workers' compensation statute. 132 Instead, Virginia law focuses
on the elements of its workers' compensation statute: (1) the injury was by
accident, (2) arising out of, and (3) in the course of employment. 33 Thus,
Virginia courts do not focus on an exception to the workers' compensation
statute but rather the applicability of the statute. "Put simply, when the injury
falls within the purview of [the workers' compensation statute], the exclusivity
provision applies.... However, when the injury does not arise out of or occur in
the course of the employment, the exclusivity provision does not apply."'' 34
Because Virginia does not offer anything new or novel, it is only offered here for
the proposition that a state can use workers' compensation as the exclusive
remedy for workplace injuries.
135
5. Kentucky: Blue Moon for Deliberate Intent Claims

Kentucky does have a statutory exception to its workers' compensation
law for injuries caused by the deliberate intention of an employer. 36 Kentucky
passed its first workers' compensation act in 1914.137 This statute was declared
unconstitutional in Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workers' Compensation

129

Id. at 1075.

130

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.

131

§ 9-509 (West 2016).
VIRGINIA ISFOR LOVERS, http://www.virginia.org/virginiaisforlovers/ (last visited Mar. 22,

2017).
132

See VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-307 (2016).

133
134

See Miller v. Washington Workplace, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 364, 371 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Giordano v. McBar Indus., Inc., 729 S.E.2d 130, 133 (Va. 2012).

135

BILL MONROE, BLUE MOON OF KENTUCKY (Columbia Records 1947). Kentucky rules in

favor of a deliberate intent claim "once in a blue moon."
136 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (West 2016).
137

DWIGHT T. LOVAN, DEP'T OF WORKERS' CLAIMS, AN OVERVIEW OF KENTUCKY'S WORKERS'

COMPENSATION LAW, http://labor.ky.gov/workersclaims/presentations/an%20overview%20of%2o
kentucky%20workers%20compensation%201aw.pdf.
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Board3 8 because it impaired compensation for personal injury.'3 9 In 1916, a new
workers' compensation act was passed providing for voluntary acceptance of the
act by employees. 140 Today, the act provides for voluntary rejection by
employees.' 4 1 The 1916 version of the workers' compensation act contained a
deliberate intention exception, which read as follows:
that if injury or death result to an employe[e] through the
deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or
death, the employe[e] or his dependent as herein defined shall
receive the amount provided in this act in a lump sum to be used,
if they so desire to prosecute the employer, and said dependents
shall be permitted to bring suit against said employer for any
amount they may desire; that if injury or death results to an
employe[e] through the deliberate intention of his employer to
produce such injury or death, the employe[e] or his dependents
as herein defined shall have the privilege to take under this act,
or in lieu thereof, to have a cause of action at law against such
employer as if this act had not been passed ....
Kentucky's deliberate 143intent statute has remained almost entirely unchanged
throughout its history.
The deliberate intention section of the act was not interpreted by
Kentucky's highest court 144 until 1955 in Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator
Corp.145 In Fryman, an employee was injured while operating a metal press
machine. 146 The employee alleged in his complaint that the employer was aware
of the unsafe working condition of the machine and knew that the machine would

138

170 S.W. 1166 (Ky. 1914).

139

LOVAN, supra note 137.

140
141

Id.
Id.

142

JAMES P. LEWIS, WORKMENS' COMPENSATION LAW OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY

12 (F.

Robertson Jones ed., 1916) (alteration in original).
143
Compare id. ("[I]f injury or death results to an employe[e] through the deliberate intention
of his employer... the employe[e] or his dependents.., shall have the privilege... to have a
cause of action at law against such employer ... ") with Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (West
2017) ("If injury or death results to an employee through the deliberate intention of his or her
employer.., the employee or the employee's dependents may... have a cause of action at law
against the employer .... ").
144 Prior to 1976, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was the state's highest court. KY. COURT OF
2010),
ed.
(3d
3
PRACTICE
APPELLATE
BASIC
APPEALS,
http://courts.ky.gov/resources/publicationsresources/Publications/P56BasicAppellatePracticeHan
dbook.pdf. The Supreme Court of Kentucky was formed in 1975 by constitutional amendment. Id.
145
277 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ky. 1955).
146 Id. at 26.
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"trip" and was not properly maintained.' 4 7 The employee alleged that because
the employer had this knowledge and the employee was still required to operate
the machine, his injury was caused by the deliberate intent of his employer.148
The court rejected the employee's theory stating that "[t]he phrase 'deliberate
intention' implies that the employer must have determined to injure the
employee., 149 Because this was the first time the court interpreted the deliberate
intention exception, it looked to other states, including West Virginia, with
similar statutory schemes. 150 The court concluded that these states all require a
specific intent to injure for an employee to qualify under the deliberate intention
exception. 15 1 Lastly, the court indicated that the Legislature did not spell out the
52
meaning of "deliberate intent," but that the statute was clear and unambiguous. 1
A more current example of how Kentucky's highest court examines
deliberate intent claims is illustrated by Moore v. Environmental Construction
Corp.153 In Moore, an employee was killed by asphyxiation when a trench he
was working in collapsed on top of him. 154 The evidence produced at trial showed
that the employer failed to take proper safety precautions as required by the
Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 155 A jury returned a
verdict in favor of the employee, but the trial judge granted a motion for
57

56
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.1 The motion was upheld.1

On appeal, the employee relied on an "inferred intent" theory used in
homicide cases. 158 The court dispensed with this theory stating that the employer
lacked the requisite intentional and vicious acts of a homicide case to eliminate
the possibility of an accident. 59 Therefore, the inferred intent approach cannot
be used to infer deliberate intent. 160 Lastly, the court stated that "[i]t must be
remembered that it's not the depravity of the employer's conduct that is being

147

Id.

Id.
149 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
150
Id. at 27. Of importance to this Note, the court cited to Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors,
148

Inc., 65 S.E. 2d 87 (W. Va. 1951).
151 Fryman, 277 S.W.2d at 27.
152 Id.
153

147 S.W.3d 13 (Ky. 2004).

154

Id.at 14.

155
156

Id.at 18.
Id.at 14.

157

Id.at 16.

158 Id.at 19.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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issue of the intentional versus the accidental quality of the
tested, but the narrow
'1 61
precise injury."
Although the holding of Fryman, as affirmed by Moore, is still the law
in Kentucky which requires a showing of determined intent by an employer to
injure an employee to qualify under the deliberate intention exception, there was
62
a significant divide in the Moore court. The decision was four to three with
163
Justice
Chief Justice Joseph Lambert writing for the minority. In his dissent,
employer.' 64
the
by
actions
deliberate
reveal
did
evidence
the
Lambert said that
He concluded his dissent by stating that
[the deliberate intention statute] allows recovery outside of the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
upon a showing of intent. The legislature has not eliminated
liability when employers act egregiously and cause the death or
serious injury of employees. But, this Court has effectively
immunized employers from payment of damages despite
egregious behavior by a draconian construction of the statute.
Instead of analyzing this case as a civil action for damages and
allowing the jury to draw proper inferences, the majority has
that would be appropriate for a
held Appellants to a standard
65
homicide prosecution.1

Ill. ANALYSIS

Deliberate intent hurts West Virginia businesses because they are at risk
166
for more liability than they would be in other states. After a review of West
Virginia's deliberate intent statute and delving into similar statutes in the
Surrounding States, along with how courts in each state interpret the statute, it is
this Note's position that the current version of West Virginia Code section 23-42 will not accomplish what the Legislature intended. The Legislature's intent for
passing this law was a part of a comprehensive agenda to67reform the justice
system in West Virginia, particularly as it pertains to torts. As an alternative
Id. (quoting Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 922 n.3 (W. Va. 1978)
(Neely, J., dissenting)).
161

162

See id.

163

Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 20 (Lambert, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 22 (alteration in original).
165
It would be difficult to find a direct correlation between business growth and deliberate
166
intent laws, as many confounding variables are present. Currently, no such empirical data exists.
The proposition of this Note is that in a check list of pros and cons, West Virginia would have one
less negative against it as employers decide where to locate business.
Chris Dickerson, Tort Reform Highlights Session, W. VA. REc. (Mar. 17, 2015, 1:46 PM),
167
164

http://wvrecord.com/stories/510588603-tort-reform-highlights-session.
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to the 2015 amendments, this Note argues that the Legislature should mimic

other states, particularly Pennsylvania 168 and Virginia, 169 by repealing the

deliberate intent exception and making workers' compensation the exclusive
remedy for workplace injury, thus accomplishing the legislative goal of
reforming tort jurisprudence and improving the business climate.
This part will address the inadequacies of the current deliberate intent
statute by focusing on how West Virginia courts might interpret the law to reveal
that the Legislature's desired change will not be accomplished and to show that
the proposed method would succeed. This part will also discuss the varying
interests at stake in the proposed change to deliberate intent by balancing those
interests. Lastly, this part will address West Virginia's business climate and why
the proposed change will better position West Virginia with the Surrounding
States to be more competitive in attracting and maintaining businesses in the
state.
A.

Expected West Virginia Court Interpretationof the 2015 Statute

Although the amended version of West Virginia Code section 23-4-2 is
a longer and more specific statute than its predecessor, this Note argues that the
new law will lead to many substantive changes in how West Virginia courts will
interpret it. This would not be the first time the Legislature issued its intent for a
law only to have the courts either overrule or blindly disregard the Legislature's
intent. 170 After all, West Virginia is labeled as a "judicial hell-hole," not a
71
legislative hell-hole.

The 2015 version of West Virginia Code sections 23-4-2(d)(1)-(2)(B)(i)
is verbatim of the 2003 version. 172 As noted previously, the major differences
contained in subpart B of the 2015 version of the law will be broken down into
three sections-(1) the actual knowledge provision, (2) the specific unsafe
working condition provision, and (3) the injury provision. Each provision will be
discussed in turn to compare and contrast the 2015 version with the 2003
version 73 of the deliberate intent statute to show how West Virginia courts might
interpret the changes.

168

See discussion supra Section I.B.C. 1.

See discussion supra Section II.B.C.4.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
171
Chris Dickerson, W. Va. Supreme CourtListed Thirdon JudicialHellhole List, W. VA. REC.
(Dec. 16, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://wvrecord.com/stories/51058816 4 -w-va-supreme-court-listedthird-on-judicial-hellhole-list.
172
Compare 2003 W. Va. Acts 388, with W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 23-4-2 (LexisNexis 2015).
173
2003 was the last time the provisions in Subpart B remained unchanged before
being
amended in 2005. Another amendment occurred in 2015, but the provisions in Subpart B did not
change. See supra text accompanying note 33.
169
170
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1. The Actual Knowledge Provision
The 2003 version of the statute states that the employer must only have
a "subjective realization and an appreciation" of a specific unsafe working
condition. 174 The first difference in the 2015 version of the deliberate intent law
175
is at section 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(ii). This paragraph states that "the employer, prior
to the injury, had actual knowledge of the specific unsafe working
,176 How will a West Virginia court rule on an employer having
condition ....
"actual knowledge?"
The statute provides some guidance to actual knowledge in three
a7 7
subparts to section 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(ii). First, it provides that actual knowledge
must be specifically proven and that evidence of an intentional failure to conduct
178
an inspection may be used to show this failure. Second, it provides that proof
that a supervisor should have known of the danger is not enough to show actual
or near misses must be proven by
knowledge. 179 Lastly, any prior accidents
1 80
evidence.
credible
other
or
documentary
The Maryland case of Johnson1 8 1 illustrates that this requirement of
actual knowledge is really not that much higher of a standard than a subjective
82
realization and appreciation of the danger standard.' In Johnson, the employer
had actual knowledge of a specific unsafe working condition: electrical wires on
a pump were frayed. 183 The employer was cited for this unsafe working condition
by a state regulatory agency. 184 When an employee was nonetheless electrocuted
and killed by this very pump, under Maryland law, the employee's family was
85
barred from a common law action.'
Taking these facts and applying them to the actual knowledge provision
of West Virginia's deliberate intent statute, a common law action would still
remain for the employee's family. The actual knowledge element would be
satisfied because the employer was written a citation for a specific unsafe
working condition. Also, an intentional failure to conduct an inspection could be
used to prove actual knowledge because the employer wrote to the citation2003 W. Va. Acts 388.
175 See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(ii).
Id.
176
177 See id.

174

178
179

180
181
182
183
184

185

Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(ii)(III).
Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708 (Md. 1986).
See id.; see also 2003 W. Va. Acts 388.
Johnson, 503 A.2d at 709; see supra text accompanying notes 110-15.
Johnson, 503 A.2d at 709; see supra text accompanying notes 110-18.
Johnson, 503 A.2d at 709; see supra text accompanying notes 110-18.
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issuing agency indicating that the condition had been corrected. 186 Lastly, if the
citation itself is admissible into evidence, actual knowledge would be proven by
all three provisions of the code. Thus, in West Virginia, this case would have the
same result under the old and new versions of the deliberate intent statute.
2. The Specific Unsafe Working Condition Provision
The specific unsafe working condition found in West Virginia Code
section 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(iii) is essentially the same as the provision in the prior
version.187 The unsafe working condition must be a violation of a safety law or a
commonly accepted safety standard in the industry.' 88 The language in the 2015
version of the law applying to a violation of state or federal law or regulation is
not any more specific than the 2005 version.1 89 Both require that the law or
regulation be specifically applicable to the unsafe working condition. 190
However, the new version goes on to specify what industry safety standards are.
The statute provides that the commonly accepted and well-known safety standard
must be a "consensus written rule or standard promulgated by the industry...
such as an organization comprised of industry members." 19'
Although the 2015 version of the statute is a little stricter when it comes
to industry safety standards, the burden is really not that much higher. With
industries searching for a competitive advantage, they are increasing
efficiency.1 92 One way of increasing efficiency is to streamline production and
processes.' 93 This cookie-cutter approach leads to systems created by industry
professionals, which are often written down. For example, the International
Organization for Standardization ("ISO")194 is one method companies are
adopting to increase efficiency.' 95 ISO is a system that a business can use so that
186
187

See supra text accompanying notes 110-18.
Compare2003 W. Va. Acts 388, with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(iii) (LexisNexis

2015).
188

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(iii).

189

Compare2005 W. Va. Acts 2086-88, with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(iii).
See 2005 W. Va. Acts 2086-88; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(iii).

190
191

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(iii)(I).
See Bruce Greenwald and Judd Kahn, All Strategy is Local, HARV. Bus. REV. (Sept.
2005),
https://hbr.org/2005/09/all-strategy-is-local.
193
See Chip Johns, Improving Manufacturing Processes Through Lean Implementation,
192

QUALITY DIG. (Apr. 22, 2015, 3:07 PM), http://www.qualitydigest.com/inside/quality-insiderarticle/tips-improving-manufacturing-practices-through-lean-implementation#.
194
ISO,http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
195

SPENCER HUTCHENS JR., INTERTEK, USING ISO 9001 OR ISO 14001 TO GAIN
A COMPETITIVE
1,

ADVANTAGE
http://www.intertek.com/uploadedFiles/Intertek/Divisions/Industrial-Services/Media/PDF/90

1400 1-Competitive-Advantage.pdf.
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employees can look up any method or procedure to perform any task across the
entire company. 196 Included in these methods and procedures are necessary
197
safety precautions that should be followed while performing said task. Thus,
an industrial safety standard has been created and written by industry members.
Because the industry safety standard burden is not that much higher and because
a violation of safety law is not any different, deliberate intent under the old and
new versions of the law would end in the same result.
3. The Injury Provision
Perhaps the greatest change to the deliberate intent law is found at
198
section 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v) which relates to the actual injury. The 2003 version
of the law only requires that "the employee exposed suffered serious injury or
death as a direct and proximate result of the specific unsafe working
condition."1 99 The language in the 2015 version is very similar, only adding the
adjective "compensable" to injury or death as defined by West Virginia Code
section 23-4-1.200 However, in the 2015 version, the law continues on to further
define what injuries can be compensated through the deliberate intent
201
exception.
2 °2
First, the injury cannot be a preexisting condition. Secondly, the injury
must (1) result in at least a 13% impairment as final award in the workers'
compensation insurance claim, (2) result in permanent damage, and (3) have
2 3 Alternatively, the injury
objective medical evidence to support a diagnosis.
qualifies if it is likely to result in death within 18 months from the date of filing
the complaint. 2 4 The statute then defines that injuries with no impairment rating
can be established by showing permanent serious disfigurement, loss of any
bodily organ, and other conditions.20 5 The statute continues on with a paragraph
about black lung disease.20 6

Telephone Interview with Jeremy Balchak, Quality Control Supervisor, Johnson Matthey,
196
Inc. (Jan. 31, 2016).
197

Id.

198
199

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v) (LexisNexis 2015).
2003 W. Va. Acts 388 (2nd Extraordinary Session).

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v). This change first took place in the 2005 version.
200
2005 W. Va. Acts 2086.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v).
201
202

Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v)(I).

203

Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v)(I)(a)-(b).

204

Id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v)(II).

205

Id.

206

See id. § 23-4-2(d)(2)(B)(v)(III)-(IV).
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Although the definitions of what injuries are compensable under a
common law action are more specifically defined in the 2015 version, it seems
that most injuries would satisfy the standard easily, leaving the most fervent
disputes to arguing whether an employer had the requisite "deliberate intent."
Even though the higher standard for injury could remove some claims out of the
court system, it probably does not do enough to substantially alter the effect of
deliberate intent claims in West Virginia.
Accordingly, because the three major revisions in the deliberate intent
law, denominated the actual knowledge, specific unsafe working condition, and
injury provisions have not significantly reformed the law, West Virginia courts
are likely to rely on past precedent and make similar applications of the statutory
deliberate intent exception to workers' compensation exclusivity. Under the
proposed method of making workers' compensation the exclusive remedy, all
claims would be covered under insurance, taking away any influence the courts
may have.
B. Proposalto Repeal the Statute and Increase Premiums
Because West Virginia's deliberate intent statute puts West Virginia at
a disadvantage, and because the Legislature's attempt to reform the act is
insufficient to make the needed change, this Note proposes that the West Virginia
Legislature repeal the deliberate intent statue. In doing so, workers'
compensation premiums should increase slightly in order for insurance
companies to cover more claims and pay higher settlements for the most serious
injuries and injuries that might have occurred under suspicious circumstance.
Also, the Legislature should make it clear that workers' compensation will not
cover instances where the common law tort of battery is committed. This
exclusion is mainly designed to cover instances of rape.
In light of the fact that the proposed method of making workers'
compensation the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries by repealing the
deliberate intent statute would be a drastic reform, it is important to consider
whose interests are most at stake. These interested groups include employees,
employers, the Legislature, the judiciary, and lawyers. Each group of interested
parties will be discussed by weighing the pros and cons for each group under
both the current law and the proposed change of repealing the law entirely.
1. How the Proposal Will Affect Interested Parties
This section will discuss how the interests of various groups will be
affected by a repeal of the deliberate intent statute. The interested groups are
employees, employers, the Legislature, the judiciary, and lawyers.
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Employees vs. Employers

Obviously, the group with the greatest interest at stake concerning the
2 °7
proposed legislation to repeal deliberate intent is the workers. The same is true
for the proposed legislation to repeal deliberate intent. An employee would lose
the ability to sue his employer at law in almost all situations. This could be
especially troublesome to an informed employee who knows that this common
law right even exists. And this proposal could be even more troublesome in a
state where a lot of people are employed in manual-labor jobs. However,
employees would not be left without any reprieve.
Assuming that the deliberate intent statute is repealed and workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy for workplace injury, what is an employee
to do to protect himself? One solution is to call on the union to bargain for
workplace-safety guarantees. For example, a union member could serve as a
company watchdog to ensure that safety violations are not rampantly occurring.
This member could serve side-by-side with the company safety representative.
This dichotomy would ensure transparency that safety protocols are being
followed, potential hazards are remedied, and if a safety violation does occur that
it was truly an accident reasonable in the industry at hand.
A second safeguard for employees would be to lobby the Legislature, as
the unions likely would, to increase whistle-blower laws. For example, if an
employee reasonably believes he is being sent into a hazardous situation, he can
politely decline and report the incident. Reporting procedures could be
implemented by statute or by regulation. If the regulatory agency believes that
the employee was correct in refusing to complete the task, any retaliation by the
employer would be forbidden by law. Multiple instances of "refusal to work"
reports could put the employer on a list for more frequent inspections. This is a
self-policing mechanism that requires well-informed employees to know their
rights and to be willing to act.
There would be one remnant of a situation where an employee should be
able to maintain a common law cause of action against an employer-an
intentional tort. This would cover the common law tort of battery. If an employer
strikes, rapes, or otherwise puts an employee in reasonable fear that he will be
it is not "in
battered, that employee would be able sue to the employer because
20 8
employment.,'
covered
their
from
the course of and resulting
The group that is likely to benefit the most from the proposed change is
the employers, but the change will not come free-of-charge. The most viable way
to make the proposed change is to increase workers' compensation insurance

For this Note, labor unions are included in the group denominated "employees" as the union
is charged with representing the workers' interests.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1 (LexisNexis 2015).
208
207
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premiums. 20 9 This will allow for more claims to be paid out to injured workers
and more serious claims to receive greater compensation awards. The grand
scheme of workers' compensation is that employers are required to pay into the
workers' compensation system.2" 0 In exchange for this, employers are not able
to be sued by employees injured at their worksite. Similarly, in exchange for even
211
less common law liability, employers will have to pay a little bit more.
The proposed safeguards for employees may or may not be met with
resistance from employers. The most likely proposal to win support from
employers would be the strengthening of whistle-blower laws. This proposal
would be more of an incentive to employers to keep workers safe and happy.
Additionally, as mentioned above, this proposal would require informed
employees with more training. It would provide an opportunity for employers'to
have more training sessions and to have a workforce that is engaged, alert, and
critical of procedures. All of these factors would lead to a more productive
workforce and find deficiencies in production to increase efficiency, thus,
leading to costs savings and more profit.
This proposal would also disincentive unionization, a plus for
employers. 21 2 If companies fail to self-police, well-informed employees will seek
an organization that can better represent their interests-the union. Furthermore,
the self-policing mechanism would help to keep government regulators at bay.21 3
Alternatively, employers are not likely to buy into the union safety representative
because it would yield too much control outside of the company's organization.
Therefore, there are options for a viable system that safeguards employees, as
well as benefit employers, should the deliberate intent statute be repealed.
ii.

Legislature vs. Judiciary

Part of the stimulus for this Note was the actions taken by the Legislature
of West Virginia to reform deliberate intent. Therefore, it is important to discuss
some of the practical considerations needed to effectuate the proposal of
repealing deliberate intent. The Legislature has already shown that it is ready and

209
See LARSON, supra note 12, at § 1.01. Workers' compensation can be thought of as a
bargained for exchange contract. In order to modify the contract, there needs to be consideration.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Such consideration is

employers pay more for employees to have less common law rights to sue.
210
LARSON, supra note 12, at § 1.01.
211

212

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 273 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Jose Messerli, Are Labor Unions a Good Thing?, BALANCEDPOLITICS.ORG (Jan. 7, 2012),

http://www.balancedpolitics.org/unions.htm.
213

See generally Rob Van Wallegham, Managing a Company's Internal Environmental

Investigation,
LAw360
(July
29,
2015,
11:19
http://www.law360.com/articles/683347/managing-a-company-s-intemal-environmental_
investigation.
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willing to pass a controversial law if it feels it is best for West Virginia.214 The
proposed change would not be any different, as it would face a great deal of
resistance from labor groups and trial lawyers. However, as discussed above, the
Legislature intended to reduce deliberate intent claims, but the law it passed is
not likely to succeed in the manner that the Legislature had hoped for.215
Accordingly, the Legislature should take its initial intent a step further.
In the 2014 election, Republicans reaped monumental gains in both
houses of the state Legislature, reclaiming both houses for the first time since
193 1.216 This success and change in the majority party led to many of the tort
reform bills that came out of the Legislature that year.2 17 However, Republicans
are not guaranteed to remain in control. Any laws that they want to enact to have
a lasting effect on West Virginia would have to be passed while Republican
sentiment is strong in West Virginia.
As previously mentioned, a repeal of deliberate intent is likely to be met
with heavy resistance by labor groups. This will be the Legislature's toughest
hurdle to pass a repeal bill. However, it can be done. The Legislature could just
run it through relying on the Republican majority and faith that the Republicans
can remain in power despite what labor groups and Democrats throw at them in
the next election.
However, a more diplomatic and compromised approach would be to
piggy-back the deliberate intent reform bill with the right-to-work law.2 18 The
right-to-work bill could have more popularity with the electorate because it is
part of a nationwide trend that garners media coverage, 2 19 whereas deliberate
intent is a more technical, legal bill that the public knows less about.
As mentioned above, workers could use the union as a safeguard for not
having a deliberate intent statute. Now that the right-to-work bill is law, the likely

214

Hoppy Kercheval, Legal Reform Bill Draws Emotional Testimony at Capitol,METRONEWS

(Jan.

21,

2015,

4:26

PM),

http://wvmetronews.com/2015/01/21/legal-reform-bill-draws-

emotional-testimony-at-capitol/.
215

See discussion supra Part III.A.

216

Chris Dickerson, Update: Republicans Gain Controlof W Va. House, Senate, W. VA. REC.

(Nov. 6, 2014, 7:50 AM), http://wvrecord.com/stories/510587978-update-republicans-gaincontrol-of-w-va-house-senate.
217 Chris Dickerson, Tort Reform Highlights Session, W. VA. REc. (Mar. 17, 2015, 1:46 PM),
http://wvrecord.com/stories/510588603-tort-reform-highlights-session.
218

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5G-1-7 (LexisNexis 2016); Jeff Jenkins, Tomblin's Vetoes Short-

Lived; Right to Work, Repeal of Prevailing Wage Now Law, METRONEWS (Feb. 12, 2016, 12:54

PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2016/02/12/tomblins-vetoes-last-only-a-few-hours-right-to-workrepeal-of-prevailing-wage-now-law/.
219

Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Approve of Unions but Support "Right to Work, " GALLUP

(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175556/americans-approve-unions-support-rightwork.aspx.
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result is a decrease in union membership. 220 The unions could then use the repeal
of deliberate intent as an incentive to retain union membership.
Lastly, the Legislature's interest comes down to separation of powers. It
has the power and duty to make laws as it deems fit and to express its intent as
to what a law should mean. It is evident from the past that courts can change their
minds.2 One year a law means one thing and the next year the very same law
could mean something completely opposite.222 If the Legislature truly desires to
pass a law that means something, it should do so unequivocally.
It was the Supreme Court of Appeals that put West Virginia in the
minority view of states holding that deliberate intent does not actually mean
"deliberate intent." 223 This is but one rule of law that earned West Virginia its
title as a judicial hellhole.224 Ironically enough, a year after passing reform to
deliberate intent, West Virginia has improved its ranking on the list of judicial
hellholes.225
As discussed previously, the West Virginia judiciary, under the current
deliberate intent law, is in a similar position as before the 2015 version was
passed.2 26 Additionally, with the possibility that Darrell McGraw, the author of
the Mandolidis decision, could get elected to West Virginia's highest court
2 the
again, 221
need for the proposed repeal of deliberate intent is illustrated. If the
Legislature does pass the repeal, West Virginia courts could be left with very
little power to interpret the law to find an exception to workers' compensation.22 8
However, the courts may have some wiggle room with the workers'
compensation coverage itself relying on the "in the course of and resulting from
their covered employment" 229 language. This would be a similar approach to that
taken by the Ohio courts in the 1980s. 230 As discussed previously, this language
would be the remnant to allow an employee to sue an employer for the intentional
220

Hoppy Kercheval, Right Time for Right-to- Work? METRONEWS (Nov. 19, 2015, 12:25 AM),

http://wvmetronews.com/2015/11/19/right-time-for-right-to-work/.
221

See discussion supra Part II.B.

222

See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.

See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
224
Chris Dickerson, W. Va. Supreme CourtListed Third on JudicialHellhole List, W. VA. REC.
(Dec. 16, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://wvrecord.com/stories/510588164-w-va-supreme-court-listedthird-on-judicial-hellhole-list.
225
Matt Maccaro, West Virginia No Longer on A TR 'S Judicial Hellhole List, METRONEWS
(Dec. 17, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://wvmetronews.com/2015/12/17/west-virginia-no-longer-onatrs-judicial-hellholes-list/.
226
See discussion supra Part III.A.
227
See Kercheval, supra note 50.
228
Assuming that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia wants to maintain the status
quo deliberate intent in West Virginia.
229
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1 (LexisNexis 2015).
230
See supra Part II.C.2.
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torts of assault and battery. 31 If the Legislature fails to expressly address this
language, West Virginia courts could use this language to include negligent
actions, similar to those found in Mandolidis 32 The worst case scenario is for
233
West Virginia to again mimic Ohio and get in a back-and-fourth constitutional
battle between the Legislature and the Supreme Court of Appeals. 34
iii. Plaintiffs' Counsel vs. Defense Counsel
A third group with an interest at stake in the proposed repeal of deliberate
intent is lawyers, especially lawyers representing injured people. Under the past
deliberate intent laws, and likely the current law, employees were left with a
common law remedy for workplace injury.235 To pursue this claim, the injured
worker would need to retain the services of an attorney to navigate the legal
system, whereas an injured worker would be more likely to navigate the workers'
compensation system claim pro se. Under the proposal, the common law remedy
would be eliminated and the need for an attorney greatly reduced.
The removal of the common law remedy will impact plaintiffs' lawyers
because, under the common law remedy, the defendants are exposed to more
liability, thus awards can be greater than what would be covered by insurance.
With a deep-pocketed defendant fully exposed, injured workers and their
attorneys, with a one-third contingency fee, can walk away quite wealthy. A $3
million verdict against Wal-Mart, Coca-Cola, Consol Energy, or some other
dream defendant would be a thing of the past.
However, plaintiffs' lawyers will not be put out of business. Under the
proposal, the frequency of insurance claims would increase with payouts being
a little larger. Thus, there is still money on the table up for grabs. Plaintiffs'
236
attorneys are clever and they "will just think of something else to sue over."
Additionally, they can just restructure their advertising campaigns to market to
injured workers filing for workers' compensation insurance claims. To assist in
navigating through the insurance system, the attorneys can make sure that their
clients are receiving the maximum amount possible. They might have to reduce

See supra text accompanying note 20.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
233 A review of the Constitution of West Virginia is outside the scope of this Note and any
constitutional questions will not be addressed.
234
See supra Part II.C.2. Going forward, judges will now be elected on a non-partisan basis
during the primary election. Mandi Cardosi, NonpartisanElection of Judges Becomes Law in WV,
ST. J. (June 8, 2015), http://www.theet.com/statejournal/news/nonpartisan-election-of-judgesbecomes-law-in-wv/article_77314d55-3cf4-5f44-9bb3-dbc0e9f~fa28.html. It is yet to be seen how
this new system will impact the court and if or how it will impact any existing opinions and
sentiments of the court.
235 See supra Part III.A.
236
Interview with Anonymous Attorney, in Morgantown, W. Va. (Feb. 12, 2015).
231
232
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their contingency fees to one-fourth, but it would be the Wal-Mart model of
practicing law: a lot of small profits over a few big profits.
On the other side of the aisle are the defense attorneys. Their stake in the
game will not be as greatly impacted by a repeal of deliberate intent, but there
will still be some changes. Defense litigators are the most likely group of defense
lawyers to be affected by the repeal of deliberate intent. Without the possibility
of going to court to defend an employer, billable hours preparing for depositions,
hearings, and trial will be greatly reduced. Although, with the common law
assault and battery torts exception, there could still be the potential for litigation,
and a bifurcated litigation at that, as that type of claim may require a criminal
defense as well.237
The repeal will benefit defense lawyers working exclusively in workers'
compensation as insurance claims will increase, and with more plaintiffs'
lawyers working the claims, the need for more defense attorneys will only
increase. The repeal would also be an opportunity for more in-house counsel for
the insurance companies to handle the increase in claims. However, the greatest
need for defense counsel might exist before any injury even occurs. Under the
proposal that could lead to heightened whistle-blower laws or even a union safety
representative onsite, compliance with safety laws before the fact and labor
negotiations would be a valuable advice for employers to retain.
Furthermore, attorneys on both sides will play a critical role in lobbying
for and against the proposed change. All-in-all, the legal community will adapt
to its surroundings and will find a way to give advice to clients regardless of
which side of the "v" the attorneys are on.
2. How the Proposal Will Affect Business Climate
A repeal of deliberate intent in West Virginia will further position West
Virginia to be competitive in garnering new businesses and retaining old ones.
The comparison to the Surrounding States reveals that if a worker were to be
injured on the job, his greatest chance of maintaining a common law cause of
action against his employer would be in West Virginia. This is a fact companies
would be well aware of and could factor into its decision on where to locate a
new facility.
As the trend in mining coal in West Virginia continues to decline, West
Virginia needs to be attractive to industries that have a choice of where to
locate.2 3 8 These new industries are likely to be technology, manufacturing, and
distribution. 39 West Virginia is geographically located central to most of

237

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9 (LexisNexis 2015).
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Meaning, for example, that coal companies can only operate where coal exists.
Shauna Johnson, Procter & Gamble Groundbreaking "Exciting Day" for West Virginia,
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METRONEWS (Sept. 18, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2015/09/18/procter-gamble-
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America's population centers. This is a crucial element for West Virginia to
succeed in attracting new businesses. But, West Virginia has borders and the
difference-geographically--of a business choosing to locate in Wheeling or
Ohio and Pennsylvania or Huntington and Kentucky is not that great. Under the
proposal to eliminate deliberate intent, West Virginia would have one less
negative in a company's pros and cons list and would be more competitive with
its Surrounding States because West Virginia's workers' compensation law
would be more comparable to the majority rule. Of course, there are other factors
like taxes, which can be addressed in another Note, and topography, but in terms
of labor and employment law and workers' compensation, West Virginia would
at least be an equal with the Surrounding States.
Another factor that a repeal of deliberate intent could address is West
Virginia's challenge of having an educated workforce.2 40 As mentioned above, a
positive to employers is that a repeal of deliberate intent would require
employees to be better informed and more aware of their surroundings.2 41 The
repeal does not address formal education, but it does address on-the-job learning
which is just as valuable as a diploma. Knowing what to look for, how systems
work, and what systems work the best is a skill that cannot be learned any other
way than by practicing it.
A repeal of deliberate intent is but a start to putting West Virginia on the
right track to attract new business and keep existing ones by alleviating employer
liability for injured workers who should otherwise be covered under workers'
compensation, but have managed to skirt around it by a poor Supreme Court of
Appeals decision and a Legislature that has failed to fully remedy that decision.
IV. CONCLUSION

Deliberate intent hurts businesses because they are at risk for more
liability than they would be in other states. To attract business to the state, West
Virginia should repeal its statutory deliberate intent exception and make
workers' compensation the exclusive remedy for workplace injury, thus bringing
the state into line with the similar approaches of several of the Surrounding
States.
The Legislature of West Virginia should repeal West Virginia Code
section 23-4-2, the deliberate intent exception to workers' compensation. In
addition, the Legislature should add language to West Virginia Code section 234-1 to make it clear that workers' compensation is to be the exclusive remedy for
workplace injuries.
Last, the Legislature will need to ensure that employers' workers'
compensation insurance premiums are increased to allow for more claims and

Hoppy Kercheval, West Virginia's Roadblocks to Success, METRONEWS (Aug. 19, 2015,
12:38 AM), http://wvmetronews.com/2015/08/19/west-virginias-roadblocks-to-success/.
241
See supra Part III.B. 1.i.
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higher dollar amounts to be paid. This solution is a remedy to make West
Virginia more competitive in attracting new business and retaining existing
businesses, as it will put West Virginia on a more level playing field with its
Surrounding States in terms of workplace safety and employment law.
Thus, if an injured worker injures his penis, he will not only be
'
compensated for the "length loss," 242
but also supplied with a prescription for
Viagra.
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